Functional words are of substantial interest in moral philosophy because they appear to lie at the juncture of description and evaluation. This is no doubt the reason that they have played a significant part in much recent discussion of the relation between facts and values. Yet, in spite of the many discussions in which functional words have made an appearance, their significance for an understanding of the relation between facts and values remains unclear. A thorough-going examination of the nature of (...) functional words would appear to be in order. And while such a study is beyond the scope of a single article it should nevertheless be possible to make a beginning. That, at any rate, is my objective in what follows. (shrink)

It is Alistair Macleod's view that what he calls Justice Judgments are at root Judgments abput states of affair and only derivatively about actions. His interest in Fredrick Hayek's book, The Mirage of Social Justice, derives at least in part from the fact that assessing the Justice of actions is logically prior to assessing the Justice of situations or states of affairs. Thus evaluating Hayek's views offers a way in which Macleod can test his own position.In responding to Professor Macleod's (...) interesting and provocative paper, I shall begin by criticising his own position with respect to the relation of Judgments about situations to Judgments about actions. I shall argue that contrary to what Macleod asserts Judgments about the Justice of actions and Judgments about the Justice of situations are inextricably intertwined. Second, I shall argue that Macleod's criticism of the view that Judgments about the Justice of actions are more basic than Judgments about the Justice of situations is a sound one. However, Hayek's attack on social Justice is not rooted in this position. (shrink)